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TRIPS-PLUS TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS:
WHY MORE MAY BE LESS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CHRISTINE HAIGHT FARLEY*
What is the relationship, if any, between intellectual property
(“IP”) law and economic development? This is an important policy
question that many have asked and sought to answer over the
years. Our basic intuition informs us that strong IP protection will
lead to increased foreign direct investment (“FDI”) and greater
local innovation. If this intuition were borne from fact, it would
make a good case for developing countries to adopt stronger IP
laws.
Thus, many have sought to prove this relationship
empirically. These studies, however, have produced mixed
results.1
Despite the absence of proof for the proposition, most
developing countries have adopted stronger IP policies anyway.2
These countries often do not perceive any cost to adopting
escalated protection. And even if they do, they may consider the
advantages in trade deals to offset those costs. And because
nations compete against one another to be the destination for
multinational investments, this environment then produces the
equivalent of an arms race amongst developing countries to have
the stronger IP laws. It has therefore been suggested that if strong
IP laws led to a strong economy, Sub-Saharan African countries
would have the strongest economies in the world since these
* Professor, American University Washington College of Law. This essay
was greatly benefitted by my participation in the University of Pennsylvania’s
Journal of International Law’s 2013 Symposium on “International Regulation of
Investment in the Rising Powers.” I am grateful for the outstanding research
assistance I received from Ellie Atkins.
1 Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Political Analysis, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND
INVESTMENT FLOWS 171, 171 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
2
See Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109,
109 (1998) (listing China, Argentina, and Mexico as examples of developing
countries expanding their intellectual property protection).
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countries have adopted some of the highest protections seen
anywhere.3
Obviously strong IP laws on the books do not always indicate
strong IP laws in practice. (Although the Sub-Saharan African case
is not entirely explained by this axiom.) In order to measure the
strength of the IP protection in any country then, a study must
consider more than the text of the laws, though the IP laws in place
continue to dominate this analysis. The International Property
Rights Index, for example, purports to measure the strength of
patent and copyright protection in 130 countries.4 This study
model includes 1) opinion surveys of IP protection; 2) an
evaluation of patent laws’ coverage, restrictions, enforcement,
duration, and international treaties ratified; and 3) the level of
copyright piracy.5 Not only does this study focus on the IP law
enacted, but it is also influenced by the level of IP law adoption.
The basic premise - and all of the studies that set out to test it presumes that the IP laws of any country can be quantified. In
order to be quantified, of course, IP laws must be identified and
evaluated for the protection they offer. This task, however, is near
impossible. First, IP law is notoriously difficult to pin down even
in highly developed countries with long histories of IP protections.
Second, this essay will explain how IP law has become increasingly
difficult to quantify due to the proliferation of trade and
investment agreements.
IP is not protected at the international level, but instead
territory by territory. And IP protections vary in each territory.
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”) may have brought us closer to harmonization,
but the framework of that agreement expressly provided that
member states could meet the minimum standards of TRIPS in
various ways.6 TRIPS member states are also free to adopt higher
3
See Maskus, supra note 2, at 115 (discussing the “declining ability” of
African countries to attract FDI).
4
About,
2013
REP.
INT’L
PROP.
RTS.
INDEX,
http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/about (last visited Jan. 17,
2014).
5
Data,
2013
REP.
INT’L
PROP.
RTS.
INDEX,
http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/data (last visited Jan. 17,
2014).
6
For example, the Preamble states: “Recognizing also the special needs of
the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the
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standards than the TRIPS minimum standards.7 TRIPS Article 1
specifically states that members “may, but shall not be obliged to,
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required
by this agreement, provided that such protection does not
contravene the provisions of this agreement.”8 For these reasons, a
variety of IP laws have been adopted by member states in the post
TRIPS environment.
In addition, bilateral free trade agreements (“FTAs”) have
proliferated post TRIPS.9 These agreements regularly include
lengthy IP provisions.10 Many, if not most, of these agreements are
between developed and developing countries.11 For this and other
reasons, the IP standards set in these agreements may not be those
that have been or would be arrived at by a multilateral standard
setting process. This forum shift has therefore been criticized.12
Many of the bilateral trade agreements that have been adopted
after TRIPS contain so-called “TRIPS-plus” standards. These
standards are TRIPS-plus because they establish higher standards
for protection than is mandated by TRIPS, extend protection to a
broader array of intangible property, and/or eradicate flexibilities
established in TRIPS.13 Each new bilateral agreement results in a
further ratcheting up of IP protections and a whittling down of
TRIPS flexibilities. These agreements tend not to contain--though
they could--any development-oriented provisions focusing on
issues such as technology transfer or public health, for instance.
domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to
create a sound and viable technological base.” Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/trips.html.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See Other IP Treaties, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/#23 (last visited Jan. 17, 2014)
(providing a list of IP-relevant bilateral treaties).
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual
Property System, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 39-44 (2009).
13
See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation Between
TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding
TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 327 (2011) (describing TRIPS-plus
standards as those introduced often in Free Trade Agreements that extend IP
protection beyond that providing for in TRIPS).
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Because in many instances, developing countries have not had an
opportunity for meaningful input into treaty negotiations, it
should not be surprising that they are not then invested in the
treaty standards after the treaties are signed.14
This ratcheting up of IP standards in FTAs could have a much
broader impact on IP protection internationally. It is not yet clear
whether or not a TRIPS member state that obligates itself to TRIPSplus protection in a bilateral agreement will then be obligated to
extend these standards to all other World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) members due to the most favored nation (“MFN”) clause
in the TRIPS agreement.15 TRIPS Article 4 provides that “any
advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by a member to
the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the nationals of all other members.”16
TRIPS does not set out criteria to determine when, if ever, bilateral
trade agreements concluded after TRIPS may be exempt from this
MFN provision. Thus, it might be possible for a WTO member to
take advantage of a TRIPS-plus standard in a bilateral agreement
to which it is not a party. A state may, for instance, shop around
for a FTA that further restricts compulsory licenses.
Bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), like FTAs, have
proliferated in number in recent years.17 Essentially, BITs protect
investment assets by prohibiting the expropriation of those assets
by the host state. Increasingly, BITs address IP protection
standards by defining investment assets as including a wide array
of IP.

14 That developing countries have not had much input into FTA negotiations
is self-evident from the fact that most of the FTAs the U.S. has signed contain
nearly identical provisions. See Free Trade Agreements, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.
15
See generally Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Honoring International Obligations in
U.S. Trademark Law: How the Lanham Act Protects Well-Known Foreign Marks (and
Why the Second Circuit Was Wrong), 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1347, 1348 (2010)
(speculating that the Most-Favored Nation Treatment provision requires the
United States to honor the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks for all World Trade Organization Member
Nations due to a bilateral agreement with Singapore).
16 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6, at art.
4.
17 See Other IP Treaties, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/#23 (last visited Jan. 17, 2014)
(providing a list of IP-relevant bilateral treaties).
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BIT arbitrations have also surged in recent years, and the
“indirect” expropriation18 theory has proven quite popular with
investors.19 An indirect expropriation may exist where an investor
has experienced an impairment of control or an impairment of
value of their investment, such as IP, if the effect is the same as
would have occurred with a direct taking. Host states must
provide investors with “effective” means of asserting IP claims and
enforcing their IP rights. To be effective, rights and remedies must
be enforceable.
The extent to which IP rights constitute an investment asset
may therefore become a central issue in investment disputes. As
such, investment arbitrators must evaluate domestic laws for how
they define the availability, validity, and scope of IP rights. These
are difficult and often elusive substantive questions of IP
protection when they occur in traditional fora and are thus likely
beyond the competence of investment arbitration tribunals to
determine. IP law is notoriously full of gray areas due to finely
balanced policy objectives and the tendency of technology to
outpace legal solutions.
These elusive determinations may become even more
challenging in the context of a BIT. For instance, in order to be
covered, the investment must be in the territory of the host state.20
Determining the location of an intangible property is, however,
fraught. What geographical space does an idea or knowledge
inhabit?
Perhaps in an effort to secure comprehensive IP protection,
BITs sometimes expressly list the various forms of IP to be
18 Shain Corey, But Is It Just? The Inability for Current Adjudicatory Standards to
Provide “Just Compensation” for Creeping Expropriations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 973,
976 (2012) (citing “creeping expropriation” as a common form of indirect
expropriation where the host country institutes a legislative act (or acts) that has
the effect of depriving the owner of the investment’s benefit without actually
seizing ownership of that investment).
19
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), during the past two decades, there have been more than 500 known
investor-State disputes submitted to international arbitration.
See Recent
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), UNCTAD,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf.
20 See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, art. 1 (“’[C]overed investment’ means, with
respect to a Party, an investment in its territory of an investor of the other Party in
existence as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty or established, acquired,
or
expanded
thereafter.”),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.
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regarded as investment assets.21 Significantly, these lists tend to
exceed the scope of IP protected in TRIPS and in so doing, they
may invite difficult legal issues. For instance, some BITs include
“goodwill” in addition to trademarks, and “confidential business
information” in addition to trade secrets.22 This expanded list of IP
may then result in novel IP questions such as how should goodwill
that does not constitute a trademark be protected, or how should
confidential business information be defined in order to
distinguish it from trade secrets?
In an investment dispute that involves the indirect
expropriation of IP, the ultimate legal question may be whether a
host state’s IP protection meets “the highest international
standards.”
But where would an arbitrator look for such
standards? If the issue was, for example, a host state’s failure to
protect business-method patents, given the variety of policy and
legislative responses to this phenomenon worldwide, and TRIPS’
silence on this issue, it is difficult to conceive how the highest
standars of protection could be determined. Would it simply be a
matter of locating the strongest protection available in any state?
And even in circumstances in which a TRIPS standard exists, it
may be argued that this is not “the highest international standard”
due to even higher standards set in certain domestic laws and
subsequent regional and bilateral agreements. For instance, an
investment arbitration tribunal might be asked to decide whether a
compulsory license for a necessary pharmaceutical constitutes an
indirect expropriation under a BIT. In such a case, it is not clear
what relevance, if any, compliance with TRIPS compulsory-license
standards would have. That is, an arbitration panel may find that
a TRIPS compliant compulsory license is nevertheless an indirect
expropriation under a BIT.
Another example of an escalating standard is the protection of
21
See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of Australia and the
Government of the Republic of Chile on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Austl.-Chile, July 9, 1996 (entered into force Nov. 18, 1999),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/details.jsp?group_id=23&treat
y_id=769.
22 See, e.g., Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of
Cameroon concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=243217.
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non-traditional trademarks that cannot be visually perceived, such
as a scent marks. Although a state may be TRIPS compliant by
refusing registration of such a mark, the legislation of many
developed countries permit such marks to be registered, and an
increasing number of FTAs insist on this protection.23
International IP law as developed through the many treaties
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”), the TRIPS Agreement, and the WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedure have emphasized domestic law remedies for the
enforcement of IP rights and a state-to-state dispute settlement
mechanism in cases where the domestic laws are below the
established standards under the treaties.24 Surely these are more
appropriate fora to decide these questions. When it comes to
asserting a TRIPS violation, a state must weigh the diplomatic costs
in bringing a complaint to the WTO against another sovereign.
Presumably, only meritorious and important claims will thus be
made. Since BITs permit investor-state arbitrations whereby
investors can commence a proceeding directly against a state,
diplomatic concerns may not be present when considering whether
to pursue a complaint.
In the case of tobacco plain-packaging regulations, there are
live disputes progressing through both fora. Currently before the
WTO is a dispute over a recent Australian tobacco regulation.25 In
addition to required large text and graphic warnings about
smoking that cover most of the packaging, the Australian Tobacco
23 See, e.g., U.S. FTAs with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Korea,
Morocco,
Oman,
and
Peru.
These
FTAs
are
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.
24 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, at art. 41.

Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this
Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements
and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.
These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the
creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards
against their abuse.
25
Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS435: Australia—Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds435_e.htm
(last
visited Jan. 17, 2014) (providing the current status of the WTO dispute).
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Plain Packaging Act requires tobacco products to be sold in logofree packaging.26 No non-word signs of any kind can be used and
word trademarks are limited to a particular font size, type, and
color and are restricted to a particular space on the packaging.27
This legislation is being challenged by Cuba, Ukraine, the
Dominican Republic, and Honduras who allege that it
impermissibly interferes with trademark owners’ rights in
violation of TRIPS.28 Troubled by the same legislation, Philip
Morris Asia Limited filed an arbitration claim against Australia
under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT asserting that such restrictions
on their use of their trademark are tantamount to an
expropriation.29 The extent to which trademark owners have a
positive right to use their trademark and how such a right, if it
exists, should be balanced by a state’s obligation to legislate public
health are important and fundamental legal questions for
international IP law. These questions are appropriately addressed
to the WTO and are beyond the competence of investment
arbitrators. Moreover, the threat of BIT arbitration claims, may
chill similar legislative efforts by other countries.
One would expect that one of the governing principles of
investment decisions is that legal uncertainly is risky business.
26
Tobacco Plain Packaging Amendment Regulation Amendment 2012 (Cth) reg
2.4.2(2) (Austl.). See Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF
HEALTH,
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/tobaccoplain (last visited July 13, 2013).
27
Tobacco Plain Packaging Amendment Regulation Amendment 2012 (Cth) reg
2.4.2(2) (Austl.).
28 Request for Consultations by Cuba, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT DS458/1 (May 7, 2013); Request
for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, WT DS 434/1 (Mar. 13, 2012); Request for Consultations by
Honduras, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, WT DS 435/1 (Apr. 4, 2012); Request for Consultations by the
Dominican Republic, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, WT DS 441/1 (July 18, 2012).
29
Another example of tobacco companies using BITs to fight anti-tobacco
legislation occurred in Thailand where companies claimed that the law requiring
ingredients to be printed on cigarette packaging was challenged as indirectly
expropriating trade secrets.
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When deciding where to invest, a host that offers legal certainty is
preferable to host that does not. An investor with significant IP
assets will seek certainty that its IP will be protected. It is said that
one of the biggest fears investing companies have is losing their
trade secrets, for instance. Thus, it is not IP laws with high levels
of protection investors seek, but confidence that there will be
predictable answers to key legal questions. By successively
increasing the complexity of IP standards, the TRIPS-plus
standards contained in FTAs and BITs make a host state’s legal
framework unknowable and thus highly unpredictable.
Significantly adding to the complexity and ambiguity of IP
protection is the current environment of ever growing legal
standards to which developing countries obligate themselves.
Ideally, an inventor, an investor, an arbitrator, or a judge could
look to domestic law to understand the rules that govern the
validity, scope, and applicable exceptions to IP rights. But today,
consulting domestic law is only the first of many steps that must be
taken to discern what IP standards exist.
Consider, for example, the governing IP law of Chile, a country
that has for many years touted its hospitality to foreign investors
and foreign trade. Today, Chile is party to over one hundred IP
agreements including multilateral agreements, BITs, bilateral and
regional FTAs, and stand-alone IP bilateral agreements.30 It is
likely that no two of these agreements protect IP in the same way.
It is also likely that few lawyers are familiar with the precise
standards contained in each of these agreements. In order for an
investor to know whether Chile offers trademark holders antidilution protection, for instance, a lawyer would be required to
expend many hours to arrive at an answer. In this environment it
is impossible to create a consciousness of legal rights. In this way,
the enlargement of IP agreements to which developing countries
believe they must adhere in order to attract FDI, ultimately works
against a free trader’s goal of reducing trade barriers.
A premise of current economic research is that a strong
economy is one that is “IP-intensive.” Thus, the so-called “rising
powers” are enjoying a current climate of IP investment that is
30
See
Treaty
Secretariat
IP-Relevant
Bilateral,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/index_bilateral.jsp (last visited Jan.
17, 2014) (providing a list of the IP-related bilateral agreements entered into by
Chile).
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dissimilar to least developed countries. And significantly, these
rising powers are increasing their own IP production.
This theory of measuring the impact that IP has on the
economy is best exemplified by mirror studies done by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) in 2012 and the European
Commission in 2013.31 According to these studies, IP-intensive
industries account for about thirty-five percent of U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP), and forty percent of all economic activity
in the EU.32 In both, trademark-intensive industries account for the
highest shares in both employment and GDP, followed by patents
and copyright.33 Trademark-intensive industries were determined
by the ratio of trademark registrations to employment in a given
industry.34
Similar studies will no doubt soon be undertaken in other
countries. In the meantime, statistics collected and analyzed by
WIPO can be used to evaluate IP intensity. These statistics inform
us that in 2012 the Chinese IP office was the largest recipient in the
world of filings for four types of IP (patents, utility models,
trademarks, and industrial designs).35 In fact, for the first time,
Chinese residents accounted for the largest number of applications
filed throughout the world for these four types of IP.36 If the
intensity of IP investment and IP production are related to
economic strength, these are good signs for China’s economy.
31
See EUROPEAN PAT. OFF. & THE OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL
MARKET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRIBUTION TO
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 6 (2013),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/intellectualproperty/docs/joint-report-epo-ohim-final-version_en.pdf [hereinafter INTELL.
PROP. RTS. INTENSIVE INDUSTRY] (discussing the EU study’s intention to mirror the
Economics and Statistics Administration and USPTO study).
32
ECON. & STAT. ADMIN. & U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS 3 (2012), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf
[hereinafter INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS]; INTELL. PROP. RTS. INTENSIVE INDUSTRY, supra
note 23, at 6.
33
INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS, supra note 24, at vi; INTELL. PROP. RTS. INTENSIVE
INDUSTRY, supra note 23, at 50-55.
34
INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS, supra note 24, at 13 (2012).
35
WIPO, 2013 WORLD INTELL. PROP. INDICATORS 3 (2013), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/941
/wipo_pub_941_2013.pdf (crediting China as the “principal force driving global
IP-filing growth”).
36 Id. at 5.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/4

04_FARLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

10/13/2014 11:08 AM

2014] TRIPS-PLUS TRADE & INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS

1071

Not unlike in the developed economies of the United States
and the European Union, trademarks are also the most used form
of IP in developing countries.37 Whereas trademark applications
have increased thirteen percent per year worldwide, non-resident
trademark applications have held steady.38 Meanwhile, resident
trademark applications have been rising principally due to resident
applications in developing countries.39 Again, China has seen the
largest growth in trademark applications—thirty-one percent.40
Brazil follows China with a twenty-two percent increase in
trademark applications.41 In contrast, the United States enjoyed
only a nine percent increase.42 India’s growth in trademark
applications surpassed both Japan and Korea.43
So if trademark-intensive industries are the key to economic
prosperity, some of the rising powers appear well positioned.
China, Brazil, and India are highlighted because they also have in
common the characteristic of being cautious and deliberate in their
adoption of IP standards. None of these countries can be said to
have rushed to adopt the highest possible IP protections. India, for
instance, took full advantage of the transitional periods for
developing countries to become TRIPS compliant.44 And China
and Brazil have attracted significant FDI with “weak” IP laws.45
Again, if stronger IP protection always leads to more FDI and local
innovation, we would have seen huge increases in trademark
filings in sub-Saharan African countries rather than China, Brazil,
Id.
Id. at 104.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 106.
41 Id. at 101.
42
See
IP
Statistics
Data
Center,
WIPO
http://ipstatsdb.wipo.org/ipstatv2/ipstats/trademarkSearch (last visited Jan. 16,
2014) (providing a tool to calculate the number of trademark filings per country
over a range of years).
43 Id.
44
See generally Nadia Natasha Seeratan, The Negative Impact of Intellectual
Property Patent Rights on Developing Countries: An Examination of the Indian
Pharmaceutical Industry, 3 SCHOLAR 339, 362 (2001) (describing the dispute before
the WTO brought by the United States against India for failing to comply with
TRIPS despite the transition period provided for developing nations).
45 Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Foreign Direct Investment
and the China Exception, in THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 153 (Robert C. Bird & Subhash C. Jain eds., 2008).
37
38
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and India.
The WIPO Development Agenda has stressed the need for a
country-specific and context sensitive approach to developing
TRIPS compliant IP protection.46 But the massive proliferation of
bilateral agreements is most likely not what WIPO had in mind.
While this environment has unquestionably produced different
regimes in various countries, it most definitely has not produced IP
laws sensitive to the needs of the developing country. Of course
that conclusion is somewhat hypothetical since one cannot be
certain about just what exactly the law is in these countries.

46 See WIPO, DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2007),
available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/general/1015/wipo_pub_
l1015.pdf.
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